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IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION IN THE POST-9/11 ERA: 
A CASE FOR INCREASED JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT AND 
RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT TO HEAR SPEECH 
SEAN D. ACEVEDO 
Following the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, the George W. 
Bush Administration actively engaged in a policy of ideological exclusion.  
During the Bush Administration, the State Department routinely denied 
visas to foreign nationals whose political views it disfavored.  The primary 
targets of ideological exclusion during the post-9/11 era were members of 
the Arab and Muslim intellectual communities.  Opponents have argued 
that ideological exclusion violates United States citizens’ First Amendment 
right to hear and debate speech.  After offering an extensive background of 
the history of ideological exclusion in the United States, this Note argues 
that the Bush Administration’s policy of ideological exclusion did, in fact, 
violate United States citizens’ right to hear and debate speech.  It then 
discusses the steps that the judiciary must take in order to create a 
sustainable policy against ideological exclusion.
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IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION IN THE POST-9/11 ERA: 
A CASE FOR INCREASED JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT AND 
RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT TO HEAR SPEECH 
SEAN D. ACEVEDO∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
During the so-called “War on Terror” that began shortly after the terror 
attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States government has openly 
engaged in a campaign of increased security.  This policy of increased 
security has, in turn, entailed a tradeoff of basic individual liberties.  To an 
extent, federal constitutional safeguards have failed to assuage the 
usurpation of the basic individual liberties of United States citizens and 
non-citizens alike.  Although the tradeoff of increased security for 
decreased individual liberties has much precedent in American history, the 
“ideological exclusion” of Muslim scholars did not become prominent 
until the latter half of the twentieth century.1  The United States 
government engaged in the practice with even more vigor following the 
terror attacks of September 11, 2001.  Using subtly crafted provisions of 
the United States Patriot Act of 2001, the George W. Bush Administration 
actively engaged in the exclusion of scholars who espoused political views 
that challenged American foreign policy during the “War on Terror.”  The 
Administration’s policy undermined the basic First Amendment civil 
liberties of United States citizens and non-citizens alike. 
The post-9/11 tradeoff of basic liberties for improvements in security 
has culminated in the reinvigoration of the United States government’s 
“ideological exclusion” of foreign individuals who seek to present 
ideological perspectives that run contrary to American foreign policy.2  
Although less severe in both gravity and pervasiveness in comparison to 
the McCarthyism policies of the Cold War era,3 the post-9/11 exclusion of 
                                                                                                                          
∗ Fairfield University, B.A. magna cum laude, 2010; University of Connecticut School of Law, 
J.D. expected 2013.  I would like to thank Professor Gordon Silverstein for his guidance and thoughtful 
feedback during my preparation of this Note.  I would also like to thank the staff members of Volume 
45 of the Connecticut Law Review for their excellent feedback and edits.  Finally, I would like to thank 
my family and friends for their patience and support. 
1 Suzanne Ito, Time to Retire Ideological Exclusion, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Jan. 21, 2010, 
6:28 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/time-retire-ideological-exclusion. 
2 Id. 
3 See infra Part III. 
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Muslim scholars has ignited anger among a number of civil rights groups.4  
These groups—the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) prominent 
among them—have argued that the ideological exclusion of foreign 
Muslim scholars violates the constitutional right of United States citizens 
to hear, question, and debate speech, as set forth in the First Amendment.5  
Ideological exclusion has also been met with vehement disapproval among 
members of the legal community.6  Other scholars have offered the 
relatively less persuasive—but not entirely misplaced—argument that 
ideological exclusion violates allegedly anti-American non-citizens’ First 
Amendment rights.7 
By focusing on the role of the judicial and executive branches in the 
practice of ideological exclusion, this Note examines three important 
aspects of this debate.  Following a brief introduction to the history of 
ideological exclusion in the United States, this Note discusses whether 
American citizens do, in fact, have a constitutionally protected right to hear 
the speech of foreign nationals.  Second, it discusses the validity of the 
claim that the Bush Administration denied entry of foreign nationals on the 
basis of their respective ideological positions.  Finally, the Note critiques 
the steps that the Obama Administration has taken in redressing the wrongs 
that the Bush Administration allegedly committed.  Although the Obama 
Administration and a number of federal appellate courts have acted 
favorably on behalf of opponents of ideological exclusion,8 a solution to 
the current problem requires a uniform and definitive ruling that 
ideological exclusion in its purest form is, in fact, unconstitutional.   
This Note offers two potential solutions to the current problem.  The 
first is a broader standard of judicial review.  The second is a balancing test 
in which the judiciary first determines whether the exclusionary policy 
infringes upon First Amendment rights, and then determines whether that 
interest outweighs United States security interests.  This, in turn, requires a 
                                                                                                                          
4 It is important to note that ideological exclusion during the Bush Administration was by no 
means limited to Muslim scholars.  There were a number of cases during this period in which the 
executive either excluded or conditioned the admission of foreign nationals into the United States.  See, 
e.g., Bustamante v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding the executive’s 
exclusion of a Mexican national on the basis that the Consulate “had reason to believe that he was a 
controlled substance trafficker,” which the court determined was “plainly a facially legitimate reason, 
as it [was] a statutory basis for inadmissibility” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Because this type 
of exclusion poses an entirely different set of questions, however, the scope of this Note is limited to 
the exclusion of Muslim scholars who were, or are, excluded in direct relation to the “War on Terror.” 
5 See Ito, supra note 1 (arguing that the practice of ideological exclusion infringes upon United 
States citizens’ right to hear constitutionally protected speech). 
6 See, e.g., Mitchell C. Tilner, Ideological Exclusion of Aliens: The Evolution of a Policy, 2 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 1–2 (1988) (arguing that exclusion on ideological grounds is, in a sense, an 
“illegitimate” practice). 
7 See David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 999–1000 (2002). 
8 See infra Part VI. 
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higher degree of judicial review over executive decision making in this 
area. 
II.  A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION AND THE 
ARGUMENT AGAINST IT 
Ideological exclusion has a long and storied history in United States 
government policymaking.9  Ideological exclusion refers to the “routine[] 
deni[al of] visas to foreign scholars, writers, and artists who . . . hold 
[certain minority or purportedly hostile] political views.”10  The United 
States government has historically taken steps—both publicly and 
privately—to exclude potentially “dangerous” foreign nationals from 
speaking publicly in the United States.11  Some of these exclusions—
particularly during the Cold War—have taken place in the public eye and 
with widespread public approval.  Others—such as the current exclusion of 
scholars of the Muslim and Arab world—have taken place far more 
surreptitiously. 
The most recent exclusion of foreign nationals on ideological grounds 
derives from § 411 of the United States Patriot Act of 2001 (“USA Patriot 
Act”).12  The USA Patriot Act significantly amended § 212(a)(3) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act.13  Under § 411 of the USA Patriot Act, 
the United States executive branch may deny the right to a visa to a 
relatively broad range of foreign nationals seeking entry into the United 
States.14  Section 411 further provides that the executive could conclude 
that an individual is “inadmissible” under § 212(a)(3) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act on the grounds that he or she was a member of, or 
participated in: 
(aa) a foreign terrorist organization, as designated by the 
Secretary of State under section 219, or 
                                                                                                                          
9 See infra Part III. 
10 The Excluded: Ideological Exclusion and the War on Ideas, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Oct. 
25, 2007), http://www.aclu.org/national-security/excluded-ideological-exclusion-and-war-ideas. 
11 See infra Parts III, V. 
12 Pub. L. 107–56, sec. 411, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3), 115 Stat. 272, 345–50 (2001).  The official 
title of the USA Patriot Act is the “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Interrupt and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001.”  Pub. L. 107-56, sec. 1(a), 115 Stat. 272 
(2001).  For an early account of the USA Patriot Act, see Michael T. McCarthy, USA Patriot Act, 39 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 435, 435–53 (2002) (arguing that the Act gives the Attorney General “greater 
authority” to “detain and deport aliens suspected of having terrorist ties”). 
13 Pub. L. 107–56, sec. 411, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3), 115 Stat. 272, 345–50 (2001). 
14 See ACLU Challenges Patriot Act Provision Used to Exclude Prominent Swiss Scholar from 
the United States, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Jan. 25, 2006), http://www.aclu.org/national-
security/aclu-challenges-patriot-act-provision-used-exclude-prominent-swiss-scholar-united- (arguing 
that the USA Patriot Act provision “prevent[s] United States citizens and residents from hearing speech 
that is protected by the First Amendment”). 
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(bb) a political, social, or other similar group whose public 
endorsement of acts of terrorist activity the Secretary of State 
has determined undermines United States efforts to reduce or 
eliminate terrorist activities.15 
Perhaps the most worrisome aspect of the USA Patriot Act provision is 
its broad scope.  By covering such an expansive class of individuals—not 
only terrorist organizations, but also any individual whom the State 
Department deems to challenge the United States government’s efforts to 
combat terrorism domestically and internationally—the Act undermines 
the basic constitutional right of United States citizens to hear protected 
speech.  Georgetown University Law Professor David Cole has pointed to 
at least two “constitutional infirmities” in the USA Patriot Act legislation: 
first is the imposition of guilt by association for an individual’s association 
with a “terrorist organization,” regardless of his or her connection to 
violence or terrorist acts; second is the government’s use of secret evidence 
to determine the outcome of legal proceedings concerning a non-citizen’s 
liberty or property, counter to the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment.16  As this Note will discuss, it was on these very premises 
that the Bush Administration deported foreign scholars.17  Following 
Congress’s ratification of the USA Patriot Act, the Bush Administration’s 
actions confirmed that the amended inadmissibility criteria would be used 
not only in theory, but also in practice.18 
Scholars and groups opposed to ideological exclusion rely on the 
textual and structural foundation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment.  The First Amendment reads, in pertinent part: “Congress 
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or 
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.”19  The argument of opponents of 
ideological exclusion is weak insofar as it relies on a perceived 
constitutional right of non-citizen foreign nationals to speech.  However, as 
this Note will discuss, the argument is much more persuasive insofar as it 
contends that American citizens have the constitutional right to hear 
speech.20 
III.  A HISTORY OF IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION IN THE UNITED STATES 
The history of exclusion of foreign nationals whose views threaten the 
                                                                                                                          
15 Pub. L. 107–56, sec. 411, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3), 115 Stat. 272, 345–46 (2001). 
16 See Cole, supra note 7, at 966–69, 1000–01.  
17 See infra Part V. 
18 See id. 
19 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
20 See infra Parts IV–VII. 
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social fabric and security of the United States reflects a history of panic 
and fear.  The government’s fear of tyranny from within and the resulting 
use of ideological exclusion have taken two distinct paths in American 
history: in one pattern—perhaps most prominent during the McCarthyism 
era of the late 1940s to late 1950s—the United States government has 
openly suppressed ideological dissent.21  In another, the United States 
government has used subtle tactics in an effort to discretely suppress what 
it perceives to be the ideologically dangerous views of foreigners.22 
When the concept of ideological exclusion is the subject of debate or 
intellectual discourse, one often discusses prominent Cold War 
intellectuals, artists, and activists.  An editorial published in the New York 
Times in 2009, for example, stated that twenty years had passed since 
Congress repealed the denial of visas to such prominent figures as “the 
Colombian novelist Gabriel García Márquez, the Chilean poet Pablo 
Neruda, and the British novelist Doris Lessing.”23  But the starting point of 
exclusion based on belief or creed—whether or not such belief was 
ideological—began more than four hundred years prior to the beginning of 
the Cold War. 
A.  The Colonial Period 
As early as the colonial period, colonists established policies that 
excluded newcomers who they perceived as “undesirable.”24  Colonists 
excluded individuals on the basis of both social undesirability—beggars, 
debtors, and paupers, to name a few—and religious belief.25  The 
Massachusetts Bay Colony, for example, discouraged the entrance of 
individuals “who did not accept its official policy of ecclesiastical 
domination.”26  Religious groups excluded during the colonial period 
ranged from Quakers and Catholics to radical religious separatists.27  
                                                                                                                          
21 See infra Part III.B. 
22 See Tilner, supra note 6, at 1 (“On the record, government officials steadfastly deny that the 
United States follows such [an exclusionary ideological] policy or that aliens are ever excluded on 
ideological grounds.”). 
23 Visas and Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2009, at A32. 
24 Tilner, supra note 6, at 4. 
25 Id. at 4, 6–7.  At least one scholar has argued that the colonists used banishment and 
deportation as a means of “rid[ding] itself of thousands of undesirables.”  James R. Edwards, Jr., Ctr. 
for Immigration Studies, Keeping Extremists Out: The History of Ideological Exclusion, and the Need 
for Its Revival, BACKGROUNDER, Sept. 2005, at 1, 2, available at http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.to
pic183766.files/Class_Ten_-_National_Security_and_Immigration/EdwardsJr_Keeping_ 
Extremists_Out.pdf. 
26 Tilner, supra note 6, at 6. 
27 Edwards, supra note 25, at 2.  For example, in 1643, the Virginia establishment ordered that 
Roman Catholic priests be deported within five days after their arrival in the colony.  Id.  The 
unfavorable treatment of Roman Catholics stemmed from Old World tensions between Roman 
Catholics and Protestants, as well as the idea that the New World was a location to which religious 
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Perhaps the most famous and celebrated early colonial banishment was that 
of Sir Roger Williams from the Massachusetts Bay Colony.28  In October 
of 1635, the Massachusetts establishment found the Puritan minister guilty 
of spreading “newe [sic] [and] dangerous opinions” about religious 
freedom and separation from the Church of England.29  The primary means 
of exclusion during the colonial era was banishment, which may properly 
be regarded as the colonial equivalent of deportation.30  There is little to no 
evidence that any of the colonies banished individuals solely on ideological 
or political grounds prior to the Declaration of Independence.31  However, 
at least one historian has argued that the colonists banished on the grounds 
of religious disposition at least partially in order to protect the social 
order.32  In a critique in support of ideological exclusion,33  Professor 
James Edwards notes that early American colonists instituted the system of 
banishment in order “to preserve and protect the character of the society 
they and their forefathers paid so high a price to establish.”34  During the 
course of American history, advocates of exclusionary policies have 
continued to base their arguments on the exigency of protecting the United 
States from dangerous outsiders. 
B.  The Cold War Era 
One may assume that colonial banishments are mere remnants of 
another era, far removed from the practice of ideological exclusion in the 
United States during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.  To 
some extent, this assertion is correct; religious-based deportation no longer 
serves as a major facet of exclusion jurisprudence.  Contrary to popular 
belief, however, ideological exclusion has occupied a noteworthy position 
                                                                                                                          
dissenters could flee as an escape from religious tyranny in Europe.  See id. (“[I]t hardly seemed 
prudent to have established a society for religious dissenters . . . only to allow a hostile takeover by 
potential persecutors.”).  The tension between Roman Catholics and Protestants only intensified in the 
eighteenth century, which was a relatively belligerent period between the Roman Catholic empires of 
France and Spain, on the one hand, and the English colonies, on the other.  Id. at 3. 
28 For a general discussion of Roger Williams’ background, as well as his banishment, see Roger 
Williams Banished: October 9, 1635, MASS MOMENTS, http://www.massmoments.org/moment.cfm?mi
d=292 (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) [hereinafter Roger Williams Banished]. 
29 Id. 
30 Tilner, supra note 6, at 6.  Exclusion was not limited to banishment; Edwards notes that other 
means of exclusion included requirements that ships’ captains supply passenger manifests and the 
imposition of duties or bonds on arrivals adjudged as a threat to public order or a burden on society.  
Edwards, supra note 25, at 2. 
31 Cf. Tilner, supra note 6, at 6–8 (arguing that, although the colonists did not banish on 
ideological grounds, they may have effectively done so insofar as a religious doctrine “entails adherence 
to a corresponding political . . . view”). 
32 See Roger Williams Banished, supra note 28 (stating that the banishment of Roger Williams 
was based on his views’ “serious threat to the social order”). 
33 Edwards, supra note 25, at 1–2. 
34 Id. at 2.  
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in the United States throughout the past century.  In fact, ideological 
exclusion reached its peak during the Cold War.   
Perhaps the United States government’s clearest and most overt 
expression of ideological exclusion occurred in 1952, when Congress 
implemented the McCarran-Walter Act.35  The origins of the Act reach as 
far back as the 1930s, when Representative Hamilton Fish called for the 
outright exclusion of communists in response to the excessively “open and 
militant” nature of communist activity during the Depression era.36  
Representative Fish and his congressional committee feared the rise of the 
communist agenda in the United States, particularly in light of the 
desperate economic conditions of the 1930s.37  Despite opposition, 
including a presidential veto, the legislature finally enacted the McCarran-
Walter Act in 1952.38 
The McCarran-Walter Act passed by overwhelming majorities in both 
the House of Representatives and the Senate.39  Upon enactment, the law 
provided thirty-three categories of excludable aliens, nine of which were 
new.40  Three grounds for exclusion covered the overlap of security and 
politics: (1) § 212(a)(27) excluded non-citizens who participated in 
activities that would be prejudicial to the public interest or public safety; 
(2) § 212(a)(28) excluded non-citizens who belonged to subversive 
organizations or taught or advocated political views; and (3) § 212(a)(29) 
excluded non-citizens who the State Department deemed likely to engage 
in subversive activities once in the United States.41  Although Professor 
Edwards argues that these subsections were “noncontroversial,”42 they 
threatened the First Amendment right of Americans to hear and debate 
speech.  Not only were these provisions prejudicial toward the interests of 
non-citizens, but they were also written in an overly broad manner.  At the 
very least, the legislature should have carved narrower provisions tailored 
to the specific and particularized security concerns of the executive branch.  
                                                                                                                          
35 The McCarran-Walter Act is officially known as the Immigration and Nationality Act.  
Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C.  
§§ 1101–524 (1982)).  According to one commentator, the years of the McCarran-Walter Act represent 
the “height” of ideological exclusion.  Susan M. Akram, Scheherezade Meets Kafka: Two Dozen Sordid 
Tales of Ideological Exclusion, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 51, 53 (1999).  The same commenter notes that 
although the McCarran-Walter Act was eventually repealed, “its most troubling provisions continue to 
be applied almost exclusively against aliens of Arab nationality or origin.”  Id. 
36 Edwards, supra note 25, at 5 (citation omitted). 
37 See id. (discussing congressional momentum to combat Communism during the Depression). 
38 Id. at 7. 
39 Id.   
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 7–8. 
42 See id. (“This noncontroversial subsection kept out aliens expected to engage in espionage, 
sabotage, public disorder, or activity that risks national security or use of force or violence to overthrow 
the U.S. government.”). 
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Instead, the Act could be interpreted to cover any immigrant or foreign 
national.  In this way, the provisions denied United States citizens the right 
to hear and debate the political and ideological perspectives of foreign 
nationals.  This issue has arisen to an even greater extent in the post-9/11 
era.43  
The primary goal of the McCarran-Walter Act was to prevent 
communist sympathizers from espousing their political views within the 
United States.44  The courts generally upheld the application of ideological 
exclusion under the Act.45  In fact, Congress made only one serious 
amendment to the Act; in 1977, the legislature enacted the McGovern 
Amendment, which permitted the Attorney General “to waive the 
exclusion of any noncitizen affiliated with an organization proscribed by 
the United States.”46  Interestingly, Congress carved an exception to the 
McGovern Amendment that prohibited waiver of the exclusion for 
members of the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1979.47  The 
McCarran-Walter Act was chief among the legislative instruments that 
resulted in the exclusion of over 8,000 non-citizen aliens originating from 
ninety-eight countries between 1952 and 1984.48 
The McCarran-Walter Act and the subsequent exclusion of alleged 
Soviet sympathizers signaled one of the most alarming aspects of modern 
ideological exclusion: it caused minority groups to fear intermingling with 
individuals who shared their own cultural or racial background.  Although 
it is likely that many immigrants during the 1950s and 1960s did, in fact, 
embrace radical communist principles,49 many others were punished 
simply because they sought affiliation with members of their respective 
racial or cultural groups.50  Perhaps the simplest means of affiliating 
oneself with members of one’s own racial or cultural group is through 
membership in organizations.  Fear of joining such groups was one likely 
consequence—intended or not—of the McCarran-Walter Act.  In this way, 
the Act created a major hurdle for immigrants seeking to assimilate into a 
new way of life in the United States.  The post-9/11 exclusion of Muslim 
                                                                                                                          
43 See infra Part V. 
44 Akram, supra note 35, at 56.  Provisions (a)(27) to (29) of the Act permitted the State 
Department to exclude or deport communists, anarchists, and members of socialist labor and subversive 
organizations on the basis of ideological disposition.  Id. 
45 Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After 
September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295, 317 
(2002). 
46 Id. at 318. 
47 Id. 
48 Akram, supra note 35, at 56–57. 
49 See Edwards, supra note 25, at 5 (arguing that it is “plain” from The Venona Secrets and 
actions by the Communist International, or Comintern, that Soviet Communists sought to undermine 
the United States government politically). 
50 Id. 
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and Arab scholars poses a slightly different, but parallel, problem.  
Although the exclusion of scholars does not impact their ability to 
assimilate into a new society, it will likely cause them to refrain from 
making assertions that they would otherwise make.  This may have an even 
more far-reaching impact; not only does ideological exclusion affect the 
excluded individual, but it may also adversely impact the ability of United 
States citizens to hear—and therefore become informed about—the 
perspectives of foreign scholars. 
C.  Beyond the Cold War: Ideological Exclusion and Judicial Review 
Throughout the greater part of the past century, the judicial doctrine of 
“consular nonreviewability” has been instrumental in protecting legislative 
enactments used by the executive branch to implement its policy of 
ideological exclusion.  Over the past forty years, federal courts have ruled 
that executive decisions excluding foreign individuals from entry into the 
United States are beyond the scope of judicial review.51  Prior to 1972, 
however, federal circuit court and Supreme Court decisions often 
contradicted one another. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Kleindienst v. Mandel52 followed a 
relatively long line of cases in which activist federal judges sought to 
cultivate a less extensive degree of deference to executive decision 
making.  During the McCarthyism era of the 1950s and 1960s, activist 
judges promulgated the “meaningful association” exception to ideological 
exclusion.53  This exception required that an act of ideological exclusion 
result from the individual’s performance of a voluntary activity in support 
of a Communist government, military, or organization.54  Unfortunately, 
the Court’s decision in Mandel brought judicial activism in this area to a 
halt.   
According to some scholars, opponents of ideological exclusion 
suffered a major defeat in the Supreme Court’s decision in Mandel.55  In 
                                                                                                                          
51 See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (upholding the constitutionality of a 
statute that delegated to the executive the conditional authority to exclude foreign nationals and 
declining to address any “First Amendment . . . grounds [that] may [have been] available for attacking 
exercise of discretion”); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950) 
(upholding a congressional statute that similarly granted the executive the authority to exclude foreign 
nationals for security purposes). 
52 408 U.S. 753 (1972). 
53 Edwards, supra note 25, at 8. 
54 See id. (providing various examples of judicial activism, including Noto v. United States, 367 
U.S. 290 (1961), in which the Supreme Court exonerated a convicted communist sympathizer on the 
grounds that he merely advocated communist doctrine—not communist action—in the United States). 
55 See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 25, at 8–9 (explaining that, in the Mandel decision, the Supreme 
Court denied the non-citizen Belgian socialist relief—despite the fact that the denial was based on mere 
advocacy for world communist principles—on the grounds that the denial for “facially legitimate and 
bona fide reasons” fell within the authority of the United States (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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Mandel, the Court reviewed the executive’s exclusion of a self-proclaimed 
“revolutionary Marxist” who had been invited to attend a conference at 
Stanford University and to lecture at a number of other universities in the 
United States.56  The Court held that § 212(a)(28) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act was constitutional—at least insofar as it vested the 
Attorney General with the conditional authority to exclude foreign 
nationals or to prescribe conditions for their entry into the United States.57  
The Court reasoned that the judiciary did not possess the discretion to 
review these types of executive decisions, regardless of concerns related to 
abuse of discretion or First Amendment rights.58  The Court explained its 
decision to decline to rule on First Amendment grounds:  
[T]he plenary discretionary authority Congress granted the 
Executive [would] become[] a nullity, or courts in each case 
would be required to weigh the strength of the audience’s 
interest against that of the Government in refusing a waiver 
to the particular alien applicant, according to some as yet 
undetermined standard.  The dangers and the undesirability 
of making that determination on the basis of factors such as 
the size of the audience or the probity of the speaker’s ideas 
are obvious.  Indeed, it is for precisely this reason that the 
waiver decision has, properly, been placed in the hands of the 
Executive.59 
Commentators refer to the judiciary’s decision to decline discretion in this 
area as the “doctrine of consular nonreviewability.”60  This doctrine, which 
has held a paramount position in United States jurisprudence for over 
seventy-five years, stipulates that the judicial branch may not review an 
executive consular officer’s decision to deny a visa to a foreign national.61  
As this Note will discuss,62 some circuit courts have only recently allowed 
limited judicial review. 
Following the Mandel decision, the Supreme Court repeatedly 
questioned the State Department’s broad discretion with respect to 
ideological exclusion decision making.  In Reagan v. Abourezk,63 for 
example, the Supreme Court reviewed a D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
                                                                                                                          
56 Mandel, 408 U.S. at 756–57 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
57 See id. at 770 (“[W]hen the Executive exercises this power [to exclude aliens] . . . on the basis 
of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that 
discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the First Amendment interests . . . .”). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 768–69. 
60 Margaret Laufman, Comment, American Academy of Religion v. Napolitano, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. 
L. REV. 1173, 1174 (2011). 
61 Id. 
62 See infra Part VI. 
63 484 U.S. 1 (1987). 
 2013] IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION IN THE POST 9/11 ERA 1443 
judgment in favor of a United States Senator from South Dakota who sued 
the Ronald Reagan Administration’s State Department for denying non-
immigrant visas to certain non-citizens who were invited to attend 
conferences or address interested audiences in the United States.64  On 
remand, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled in favor 
of the Senator.65 
Regardless of the reasoning behind the policy of ideological exclusion 
in the United States, the doctrine raises very serious concerns about the 
First Amendment rights of American citizens.  Furthermore, the very fact 
that the United States government has, in the vast majority of cases, denied 
that it excludes foreign nationals on the basis of ideology suggests that 
such exclusions are in some way wrong.  The next section will turn to a 
discussion of the judiciary’s recognition of a constitutionally protected 
right to hear speech. 
IV.  THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE RIGHT TO HEAR SPEECH 
The constitutional right of United States citizens to hear the speech of 
foreign nationals is of fundamental importance to an analysis of the role of 
the judiciary.  Although it is well known that the First Amendment protects 
United States citizens from the government’s infringement on their own 
right to voice their opinions, it is less widely understood that the First 
Amendment protects citizens’ right to hear the speech of others.66  In fact, 
the Supreme Court has consistently recognized such a right of United 
States citizens to hear speech under the First Amendment.  The right of 
United States citizens to hear speech can and should be applied in the 
context of Muslim and Arab scholars speaking in public forums in the 
United States. 
The Supreme Court recognized the First Amendment right of United 
States citizens to hear speech in the landmark case, Red Lion Broadcasting 
Co. v. FCC.67  Through the administrative rulemaking process, the FCC 
required broadcast stations to present public issues that were of interest to 
the general public.68  It further required the broadcast stations to give each 
side of the public issues fair coverage.69  As part of this administrative 
rulemaking, the FCC delineated an “equal time” rule and a “response to 
personal attack” rule.70  The Court upheld both rules.71  Writing for the 
                                                                                                                          
64 The Implications of “Abourezk v. Reagan,” CAPITOL HILL CUBANS (June 11, 2009, 12:18 PM), 
http://www.capitolhillcubans.com/2009/06/implications-of-abourezk-v-reagan.html. 
65 Edwards, supra note 25, at 10. 
66 OFF. OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, CAL. STATE UNIV., HANDBOOK OF FREE SPEECH ISSUES 1 (2009). 
67 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
68 Id. at 369. 
69 Id.  
70 Id. at 369–71. 
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majority, Justice Byron White reasoned that the right of the viewers and 
listeners to hear speech was of chief importance to the Court’s decision: 
[T]he people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by 
radio and their collective right to have the medium function 
consistently with the ends and purposes of the First 
Amendment.  It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not 
the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.72 
In its analysis in Red Line Broadcasting, the Court focused on the right 
of United States citizens to receive information.  The Court’s policy 
rationale for the right to receive information was that individuals should 
have the freedom and liberty to differentiate between and choose among a 
variety of sources of information, perspectives, and ideas.73 
The Court’s reasoning in Red Lion Broadcasting is highly applicable 
in the context of Muslim and Arab scholars speaking in the United States.  
When a court does, in fact, rule on ideological exclusion, it will likely 
determine whether United States citizens have a right to hear 
constitutionally protected speech, rather than whether non-citizens have a 
constitutionally protected right to speak.  The Red Lion Broadcasting 
analysis can easily be applied to this case.  By excluding Muslim scholars, 
the United States government is not only forbidding the excluded 
individuals from speaking; it is also infringing upon the right of United 
States citizens to hear the excluded individuals speak.  This is the most 
troublesome encroachment of First Amendment individual liberties.  The 
United States government is effectively forbidding United States citizens—
the “listeners” of the speech of foreign nationals—from exercising the right 
to hear. 
V.  THE CURRENT PROBLEM:   
IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION DURING THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 
While the United States government’s practice of ideological exclusion 
during the late twentieth century targeted communist sympathizers, the 
policies of the Bush Administration primarily impacted Arab and Muslim 
scholars.  As the following section will discuss, the lack of judicial 
oversight during the Bush era necessitates further measures that would 
serve as a check on the executive’s ability to exclude individuals who 
contribute to constructive intellectual and political discourse in the United 
States. 
                                                                                                                          
71 Id. at 380. 
72 Id. at 390 (emphasis added). 
73 See id. (“It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, 
moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here.  That right may not constitutionally be 
abridged either by Congress or by the [Federal Communications Commission].”). 
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From the very outset of the “War on Terror,” the Bush Administration 
“consistently asserted that it has the authority to engage in ideological 
exclusion.”74  Just six weeks after the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, 
Congress passed the USA Patriot Act.75  The USA Patriot Act significantly 
enhanced the United States government’s security interests at the expense 
of individual liberties.76  Among other provisions, the Bush Administration 
benefited from the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, which precludes 
judicial review of its denial of visas to controversial scholars.  Although 
there were likely many cases of ideological exclusion during the Bush 
Administration, the cases of two scholars—Professors Tariq Ramadan and 
Adam Habib—received broad attention from a number of media outlets.  
Following a discussion of the plight of these individuals during the Bush 
Administration, the next section focuses on the outcome of those cases 
during the Obama Administration. 
A.  Pre-9/11: Exclusion of Arab and Muslim Scholars in the 1990s 
It is important to note that the ideological exclusion of Arab and 
Muslim scholars did not begin during the Bush Administration.  Rather, 
the current exclusion of Arab and Muslim intellectuals began at least as 
early as the late 1990s.77  In a 1999 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 
article, Professor Susan Akram argued that the ideological exclusion of 
Arab and Muslim scholars was both dangerous and—even more 
alarmingly—likely to succeed because of the “negative stereotyping 
equating them with terrorists,” their “negligible political muscle,” and the 
“legislative and executive activity directed to silence, exclude, deport and 
restrict them.”78   
During the Clinton Administration, the State Department used a 
variety of tactics to exclude Muslim scholars.  Not only did Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright target Muslim and Arab scholars, but she did so 
discretely by using classified evidence.  By 1999, at least twenty-five 
immigrants in the United States faced deportation or removal on the basis 
of “evidence that the Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . refused to 
disclose” on the grounds that it was “classified.”79  Even prior to the 
attacks of September 11, 2001, there was a widespread belief among 
                                                                                                                          
74 Timothy Zick, Territoriality and the First Amendment: Free Speech at—and Beyond—Our 
Borders, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1543, 1556–57 (2010). 
75 USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. 107–56, sec. 1(a), 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
76 See Cole, supra note 7, at 966 (stating that the USA Patriot Act seeks to combat terrorism by 
making non-citizens deportable for activities ranging from associational activity and speech). 
77 Akram, supra note 35, at 53–54 (stating that the McCarran-Walter Act’s most troubling 
provisions continued to be applied against Muslim and Arab scholars during the 1990s). 
78 Id. at 54. 
79 Id. at 51–52. 
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members of the legal community that the use of such “classified evidence” 
in deportation proceedings targeted the speech, association, and religious 
activities of Muslim immigrants, Arab immigrants, and permanent 
residents of Arab or Muslim origin.80  Even more disturbing was the 
adverse impact that the Clinton Administration’s tactics had on the right of 
citizens to hear speech under the First Amendment.  Any infringement on 
the right of individuals to hear speech necessarily decreases public 
discourse and progressivism.  In seeking to further its own interests, the 
Clinton Administration undermined the ability of citizens and non-citizens 
alike to speak on issues that were of vital importance to an evolving 
society.  It is likely that the Clinton Administration’s failure to understand 
the need for public discourse played a significant role in cross-cultural 
misunderstanding between Arabs and Muslims, on the one hand, and 
United States citizens, on the other.  Furthermore, ideological exclusion 
during the Clinton Administration paved the road for the exclusionary 
policies of the Bush Administration. 
B.  Professor Tariq Ramadan 
Although ideological exclusion was by no means limited to Arabs and 
Muslims, the “War on Terror” has disproportionately impacted members of 
these communities.  American Academy of Religion v. Napolitano81 was 
the first major case that challenged the Bush Administration’s adverse 
treatment of non-citizen Muslim and Arab scholars.  In Napolitano, the 
organizational plaintiffs challenged the Department of Homeland Security 
and the State Department82 regarding the exclusion of Tariq Ramadan, a 
Swiss-born Islamic scholar who specializes in the integration of Muslim 
beliefs with Western European culture and society.83  Ramadan has taken 
positions on a number of controversial issues.  He has argued, for example, 
that Muslims “can be both fully Western and fully Muslim,” and that they 
“need not simply choose a path of assimilation or a path of isolation.”84  
According to some commentators, however, the State Department may 
have feared Ramadan’s familial relation to his “radical” grandfather, 
Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood.85 
                                                                                                                          
80 See, e.g., id. at 52. 
81 573 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2009). 
82 Francesco Isgro, Second Circuit Reviews Visa Denial: First Amendment Trumps Consular 
Nonreviewability Doctrine, IMMIGR. LITIG. BULL., June–July 2009, at 1, 1. 
83 573 F.3d at 119.  Ramadan has published twenty books and more than seven hundred articles 
focusing on the integration of Muslim beliefs with Western European culture and society.  American 
Academy of Religion v. Napolitano–Case Profile, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Apr. 9, 2010), 
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/american-academy-religion-v-napolitano-case-profile. 
84 Kirk Semple, At Last Allowed, Muslim Scholar Visits, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2010, at A29.  
Semple describes Ramadan as a “polarizing figure in the world of contemporary Islamic studies.”  Id. 
85 See id. (describing the Muslim Brotherhood as a “sometimes-violent political group in Egypt”). 
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Prior to August 2004, Ramadan regularly visited the United States as a 
speaker at the State Department and some of America’s most prestigious 
institutions of higher education.86  In January 2004, Ramadan accepted a 
tenured position to teach religion, conflict, and peace building87 at the 
University of Notre Dame.88  The United States embassy subsequently 
revoked his visa without explanation.  It did, however, disclose upon 
repeated inquiry that it had done so under the USA Patriot Act provision 
stating that the government may exclude prominent individuals who 
“endorse or espouse terrorist activity.”89  The executive branch offered a 
rather attenuated line of reasoning for its denial of Ramadan’s visa; it 
stated that the scholar had given a monetary donation to a Swiss-based 
charity, which in turn funded Hamas, a militant Palestinian group.90  
Professor Ramadan, however, denied having any knowledge of the 
connection between the Swiss-based charity and Hamas or any other 
terrorist-related activities.91 
The exclusion of Professor Ramadan represents the broad anti-Muslim 
and anti-Arab position that the Bush Administration took in denying visas 
to foreign scholars.  It was not until 2010, after several months during 
which Professor Ramadan’s visa was withheld, did the Second Circuit 
overturn the denial of Professor Ramadan’s visa.92 
C.  Professor Adam Habib 
A second example of the Bush Administration’s exclusion of Arab and 
Muslim scholars is the case of Adam Habib, a professor at South Africa’s 
University of Johannesburg.93  The South African intellectual community 
regarded Habib as “an expert on issues of democracy, governance, race, 
and South African politics, public policy, and social movements [and] . . . a 
vocal critic of various aspects of U.S. foreign policy, including the war in 
Iraq.”94  The State Department was likely most troubled by Professor 
Habib’s vocal criticism of its foreign policy objectives during the “War on 
Terror.” 
                                                                                                                          
86 Napolitano, 573 F.3d at 119. 
87 Semple, supra note 84. 
88 Napolitano, 573 F.3d at 119. 
89 Id. at 119–20. 
90 See Semple, supra note 84 (“[Executive o]fficials eventually pointed to Mr. Ramadan’s 
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92 See infra Part VI.A. 
93 Patrick Bond, Shutting the Door on Academic Exchange: The Exclusion of South African 
Scholar Adam Habib from the United States, DEMOCRACY & SOC’Y, Spring 2008, at 10. 
94 American Sociological Association et al. v. Clinton, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Jan. 20, 
2010), http://www.aclu.org/national-security/american-sociological-association-et-al-v-clinton. 
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Professor Habib, a South African citizen, sought entry into the United 
States in November 2006.  He had been invited to meet with members of 
the Social Science Research Council, Columbia University, the National 
Institutes of Health, and the World Bank.95  Upon his arrival at John F. 
Kennedy International Airport in New York City, however, the State 
Department forbade Habib from entering the United States.96  Professor 
Habib initially thought that his visa denial erroneously stemmed from his 
detention as a political prisoner under the South African apartheid 
regime.97  However, Habib’s assumption was incorrect; the State 
Department subsequently extended the exclusion to Habib’s wife and two 
sons.98  Even more alarmingly, the State Department never communicated 
its reasons for revoking the visas of Professor Habib and his family.99 
Although the ACLU almost immediately challenged Professor Habib’s 
visa denial, the State Department’s decision was not overturned until 
January 2010, when former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton signed an 
order effectively ending the exclusion.100  Habib subsequently received a 
ten-year visa to enter the United States and attended various meetings 
throughout the country.101  However, the four-year period during which the 
State Department denied Professor Habib’s visa signals an alarming policy 
of ideological exclusion.  
D.  Other Cases of Ideological Exclusion During the Bush Era 
Although the experiences of Professors Tariq Ramadan and Adam 
Habib are of primary focus in this Note, it is important to emphasize that 
their cases merely represent the widespread visa denials that took place 
during the Bush Administration.  Following the events of September 11, 
2001, the Bush Administration also denied visas to Carlos Alzugaray 
Treto, Waskar Ari, John Clark, and Haluk Gerger.102  Interestingly, the 
government in these cases—like those of Ramadan and Habib—targeted 
both teaching about activism and mere theoretical teachings about “anti-
American” perspectives.  Although many questions—including accuracy—
                                                                                                                          
95 Gwendolyn Bradley, Scholars Excluded from the United States, QUESTIA, 
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96 Bond, supra note 93, at 10. 
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may effectively undermine the non-citizens’ positions in some or all of 
these cases, the alleged widespread use of ideological exclusion during the 
Bush Administration is cause for concern.  These concerns were not 
addressed until President Barack Obama entered office in 2009.103  As the 
following sections will discuss, there is a need for a definitive judicial 
ruling in each federal circuit that the ideological exclusion of Muslim 
scholars infringes upon the First Amendment right of United States citizens 
to hear constitutionally protected speech. 
VI.  THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION AND THE FEDERAL COURTS:   
STEPS MADE AND STEPS NEEDED 
During Hillary Clinton’s tenure as Secretary of State, the Obama 
Administration took a number of steps to overturn ideological exclusions 
that took place during the Bush Administration.  In 2010, the ACLU filed 
two successful actions on the part of American organizations seeking the 
reversal of visa denials carried out during the Bush Administration: 
American Academy of Religion v. Napolitano104 and American Sociological 
Association v. Clinton.105  Furthermore, a more dated—but also better 
established—line of United States Supreme Court cases have recognized a 
First Amendment right to “hear, speak, and debate with” a visa 
applicant.106  Although the steps that the Obama Administration has taken 
have been relatively narrow and unrepresentative, these cases provide a 
solid groundwork for potential future action by the State Department and 
the courts. 
A.   Federal Court Discretion?:  American Academy of Religion v. 
Napolitano 
Although Napolitano marked the resurgence of ideological exclusion 
during the Bush Administration, it also demonstrated the substantial 
progress that the courts and the Obama Administration have made in 
overturning ideology-based visa denials.  Given Ramadan’s reputation as a 
controversial figure—since his views are not universally regarded as 
“antagonistic to” American foreign policy per se—the ACLU’s challenge 
of the State Department’s denial of Ramadan’s visa application is critical 
to an understanding of the strides that the Obama Administration and the 
federal courts have made in countering the exclusionary policies of the 
Bush Administration.   
In Napolitano, the organizational plaintiffs challenged the decision of 
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the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to 
grant summary judgment in favor of former Secretary of the Department of 
Homeland Security Michael Chertoff and former Secretary of State 
Condoleeza Rice.107  At the appellate level, the appellants-in-error claimed 
that the exclusion of Ramadan violated their First Amendment right to hear 
speech.108  After finding that United States organizations do, in fact, have 
First Amendment rights at stake when the State Department excludes 
foreign scholars, artists, and politicians, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling.109  This decision 
marked a substantial departure from the “hands off” demeanor that many 
courts displayed during the Bush Administration.  Indeed, it signaled a 
shift from the doctrine of consular nonreviewability to one in which the 
judiciary takes a more active role in reviewing the potential repercussions 
that executive actions have on the constitutional rights of American 
citizens. 
The approach that the Court took in Napolitano would serve as an 
effective foundation for future judicial review of visa denials.  The 
significance of the case lies in its two distinct but equally important 
components.  First, the substantive outcome of the case itself—the 
overturning of the executive’s denial of Ramadan’s visa—signals a change 
in the perception of at least one of the federal courts with regard to this 
issue.  The Second Circuit has finally recognized that a visa denial may, in 
fact, infringe upon—or at least implicate—the First Amendment rights of 
American citizens and organizations.  Second, the ACLU’s successful 
representation of the three organizational plaintiffs in this case—the 
American Academy of Religion, the American Association of University 
Professors, and the PEN American Center—suggests that the battleground 
for adjudication on the issue will center on the constitutional right of 
American citizens—though not necessarily foreign nationals—to hear and 
debate the speech. 
The two most obvious shortfalls of Napolitano are: (1) it is not binding 
on courts outside the Second Circuit; and (2) it is difficult to calculate how 
narrowly or broadly the decision will be interpreted in the future.  These 
factors equate to both unreliability and unpredictability.  However, the case 
also marks a substantial departure from the policies of the Bush 
Administration and from the doctrine of consular nonreviewability. 
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B.   New Administration, Fresh Perspective?:  American Sociological 
Association v. Clinton 
The recent trend toward admission of foreign nationals whose 
ideological perspectives differ from the American government’s stance in 
the “War on Terror” has not been limited to the courtroom.  Since the 
inauguration of President Barack Obama in January 2009, the State 
Department has changed its tone with respect to ideological exclusion.  
Perhaps the most well-known case dealing with this issue was American 
Sociological Association v. Clinton.110  This action, which the ACLU 
brought on behalf of the American Sociological Association, challenged 
the exclusion of Adam Habib, the professor at the University of 
Johannesburg who had been invited to lecture in the United States.111  
While Habib’s case was pending in federal court, however, then Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton announced the reversal of the State Department’s 
prior revocation of the professor’s visa.112  Professor Habib subsequently 
planned to attend various conferences and meetings in the United States.113 
At least one commentator has labeled the State Department’s 
overturning of the exclusion as a “major victory for civil liberties.”114  
While such optimism is both warranted and well founded, it must also be 
exercised with caution.  The following section will discuss the ephemeral 
nature of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s orders.  Although it is 
unlikely that the State Department will again revoke the visas of Professors 
Ramadan and Habib, it is very possible—perhaps even likely—that the 
State Department will deny visas in the future. 
VII.  FROM IMPROVEMENT TO SUSTAINABILITY:  THE NEED FOR MORE 
WIDESPREAD JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT 
It is undeniable that the Obama Administration has taken significant 
steps in an effort to redress the wrongs committed by the Bush 
Administration with respect to ideological exclusion.  Given the political 
reality of four-year presidential terms, however, even the most uninformed 
observer can foresee the potent instability of Secretary of State Clinton’s 
orders.  Furthermore, only the Second Circuit has affirmatively asserted the 
right of the judiciary to review the State Department’s orders of 
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exclusion.115  These realities lead to an important question: What steps can 
be taken to provide accountability in the State Department?  The most 
effective means of providing such accountability would be through closer 
judicial scrutiny in federal circuit courts throughout the United States.  Not 
only would closer judicial scrutiny overturn past visa denials on First 
Amendment grounds, but it would also serve as a disincentive for the 
executive branch to revoke visas in the future. 
The central obstacle to curbing the ideological exclusion of Arab and 
Muslim scholars is the doctrine of “plenary power” in matters concerning 
immigration.116  Professor Susan Akram points to two “discrete” aspects of 
the court’s plenary power in ideological exclusion jurisprudence: “(1) that 
the Constitution does not constrain Congress or the Executive in matters 
concerning immigration; and (2) that the courts will not review 
congressional or executive action in the immigration area [sic].”117  There 
have been two interpretations of the principle that the Supreme Court 
promulgated in Mandel.118  One interpretation suggests that the Court 
applied its plenary review power.119  The other suggests that it did not.120  
However, any sustainable policy against ideological exclusion—in the 
current “War on Terror” or otherwise—would require a reassessment of 
the judicially created plenary power and the Mandel decision. 
The best approach would be for courts to adopt an amended version of 
the Second Circuit’s interpretation in Napolitano.  The Second Circuit’s 
approach did not establish a doctrine of broad judicial review; rather, it 
provided a doctrine of narrow judicial review.  Under the Second Circuit’s 
approach, the judiciary simply has the authority to review the effect that 
exclusion has on the First Amendment rights of American citizens.  
However, the Court’s test should not be limited to the Napolitano analysis.  
Perhaps the most suitable test would be for the Court to pose the following 
two questions: (1) does the government action infringe upon the First 
Amendment rights of either the person subject to exclusion or United 
States citizens?; and (2) if so, how does this balance against the United 
States government’s legitimate policy goal of furthering its security 
objectives?  Ideally, the Court would presume that the individual’s First 
Amendment rights should be protected.  Under this approach, the judiciary 
would likely overrule many of the executive’s ideological exclusion 
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decisions that infringe on First Amendment rights.  It would likely mend 
the current system in which there are very minimal means of protecting the 
constitutionally protected right of American citizens to hear speech and 
engage in meaningful debate.  Courts may also be more willing to assume 
the role of balancing security interests against First Amendment interests, 
rather than merely reviewing First Amendment rights regardless of the 
potential security threat. 
There are two possibilities in actions against ideological exclusion.  In 
the first case, the application would be made on behalf of a United States 
citizen asserting his or her First Amendment right to hear speech.  The 
second possibility would be that a non-citizen would apply on his or her 
own behalf.  A non-citizen’s application would face a much more difficult 
burden.  In this case, any steps toward judicial discretion require that the 
courts understand the policy implications of ruling in favor of non-citizens.  
Professor David Cole provides three reasons for treating non-citizens the 
same as citizens.121  First, the Constitution imposes “substantial limits” on 
tradeoffs of immigrants’ liberties for citizens’ security.122  By both 
domestic and international standards, the basic rights that are at stake in 
exclusion cases—political freedom, due process, and equal protection of 
the laws—apply to all persons subject to the laws, rather than citizens 
alone.123  Second, a double standard undermines the legitimacy of the 
United States government both domestically and internationally, and 
therefore would be counterproductive in both spheres.124  Legitimacy is 
important at both the domestic level and the international level, as it leads 
to greater cooperation among members of both communities.  Third, 
permitting the government to create unfavorable policies for non-citizens 
establishes precedent for the government’s adverse treatment of United 
States citizens.125  These policy implications necessitate a type of judicial 
review that takes into account the propensity of the executive to infringe 
upon the rights and entitlements of United States citizens and non-citizens 
alike. 
Although well-founded, Professor Cole’s arguments are certainly not 
all-inclusive.  One can offer at least two more persuasive policy reasons for 
abolishing ideological exclusion.  The first reason is related to the “melting 
pot” theory that has been prominent throughout much of United States 
                                                                                                                          
121 Cole, supra note 7, at 957. 
122 Id. 
123 See id. (arguing that political freedom, due process, and equal protection of the laws are human 
rights, rather than mere “special privileges stemming from a specific social contract”). 
124 Id. at 958. 
125 See id. at 959 (pointing to the Enemy Alien Act of 1798, which Congress originally meant to 
apply only to non-citizens, as a precedent for the government’s internment and otherwise adverse 
treatment of Japanese-American citizens of the United States during the Second World War). 
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history.126  Throughout most of its history, the United States has accepted 
conflicting cultural, political, and social viewpoints—regardless of the 
potential repercussions of such broad tolerance.  The open discourse of 
these political and ideological perspectives suggests that the American 
“melting pot” theory is not limited to cultural and social integration; rather, 
it covers various types of thought, including differing sociopolitical 
viewpoints.127  Without the presence of differing ideological viewpoints, 
the “melting pot” will effectively cease to exist.  Ideological exclusion 
serves as a proverbial “wall” between the United States and political 
discourse.  If the government is to continue to accept differing ideological 
perspectives, it must cease excluding Muslim and Arab scholars on purely 
ideological and political grounds.  
One scholar’s recent analysis, favorable to ideological exclusion, 
ironically generates another policy reason for removing ideological 
exclusion from the United States government’s agenda.  According to 
Professor James Edwards, the exclusion and removal of aliens who exhibit 
“unwanted characteristics” has become a “traditional American 
practice.”128  Professor Edwards draws a parallel between past instances of 
ideological exclusion and the heightened concerns with post-9/11 
Islamofascism.129  He points to the observations of journalist Michelle 
Malkin: 
The Japanese espionage network and the Islamic terrorist 
network exploited many of the same immigration loopholes 
and relied on many of the same institutions to enter the 
country and insinuate themselves into the American 
mainstream.  Members of both networks arrived here on 
student visas and religious visas.  Both used spiritual 
centers—Buddhist churches for the Japanese, mosques for 
the Islamists—as central organizing points.  Both used 
native-language newspapers to foment subversive tendencies.  
Both leaned on extensive ethnic- or religious-based 
fundraising groups for support—kais for the Japanese, 
                                                                                                                          
126 Rogers Brubaker, The Return of Assimilation? Changing Perspectives on Immigration and Its 
Sequels in France, Germany, and the United States, 24 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 531, 531 (2001). 
127 See id. at 532 (describing the “melting pot” as covering a wide range of differing perspectives, 
including: movements to preserve or strengthen regional languages and cultures; Black Power, Afro-
Centrist, and other anti-assimilationist movements involving African Americans; gay pride movements; 
and “an understanding of politics emphasizing the pursuit of putatively universal interests to one 
emphasizing the recognition of avowedly particularistic identities”). 
128 Edwards, supra note 25, at 2. 
129 See id. at 14 (drawing similarities between past instances of ideological exclusion—including 
those implemented against Axis agents during World War II and those against Soviet sympathizers 
during the Cold War—and the exclusion of Arab and Muslim scholars during the Bush 
Administration). 
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Islamic charities for Middle Eastern terrorists. . . . Both 
aggressively recruited American citizens as spies or 
saboteurs, especially . . . inside their ethnic communities.  
Both were spearheaded by fanatics with an intense interest in 
biological and chemical weapons.130 
The flaw in Edwards’s argument lies in his reliance on what he perceives 
to be a “traditional American practice.”  Regardless of whether ideological 
exclusion is a “traditional American practice”—an assertion that is 
debatable in itself—the practice is wrongful.  Provided that they possess 
the ability to review the State Department’s judgments, the courts should 
ban the practice of ideological exclusion for posterity—regardless of how 
often the government has used it in the past.  This argument is based on the 
common sense notion that the mere fact that an action has been taken in the 
past neither necessitates nor justifies its use in the future. 
Professor Edwards further argues that foreign terrorist organizations 
launched significant operations in the United States both before and after 
the terror attacks of September 11, 2001.131  This argument has virtually no 
bearing on the issue.  During the Bush Administration, the State 
Department excluded foreign scholars from the United States.  Very few 
observers would argue that the State Department should not have the 
authority to exclude terror organizations in an attempt to prevent them 
from recruiting or training in the United States.  The benefit of exclusion 
on these grounds is not profoundly ideological; rather, the exclusion of 
terror organizations is a necessary means of fostering increased national 
security. 
The actions of the Obama Administration and the Second Circuit are 
necessary, but not sufficient, steps in the abolition of ideological exclusion 
in the United States.  Even following the decisions by the State Department 
and the Second Circuit, the actions of the Obama Administration and the 
courts suggest that, although ideological exclusion must be limited, it is 
also a necessary national security measure.  The courts must take the lead 
role in abolishing—or at least relinquishing—ideological exclusion.  
Nowhere is judicial review a more vital component of a free and 
democratic society than where constitutional rights are at stake. 
                                                                                                                          
130 Id. (quoting Michelle Malkin, In Defense of Internment: The Case for ‘Racial Profiling’ in 
World War II and the War on Terror, MICHELLEMALKIN.COM (Aug. 3, 2004), 
http://michellemalkin.com/2004/08/03/in-defense-of-internment-2/). 
131 See id. at 14–15 (noting various instances of foreign terrorist organizations’ activities in the 
United States, including a basic terrorist training and recruitment program run by Hamas outside 
Chicago in 1990). 
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VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The Obama Administration has made significant strides in its attempt 
to retire ideological exclusion.  Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
has been at the forefront of the battle against Bush-era tactics that sought to 
prevent the spread of “dangerous” perspectives by excluding certain public 
individuals from the United States.  This Note seeks to demonstrate that, 
while it has taken a number of significant steps, the Obama Administration 
must continue to take further action to combat the policy.  As an ACLU 
staff attorney with the National Security Project, Melissa Goodman, 
concisely stated following Hillary Clinton’s January 2010 orders: “The 
Obama administration should now conduct a broader review of visas 
denied under the Bush administration, reverse the exclusions of others who 
were barred because of their political beliefs and retire the practice of 
ideological exclusion for good.”132 
The abolition of ideological exclusion requires action on the part of the 
legislature, the executive, and the judiciary.  First, the legislature must not 
enact laws that undermine basic individual liberties—regardless of whether 
the individual is a citizen or non-citizen.  Second, under its Article II 
authority, the executive—the State Department in particular—must follow 
the lead of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, whose actions against 
ideological exclusion proved very successful.  Finally, the judiciary has the 
most important role to play.  It must implement a heightened level of 
judicial review over the actions of the executive branch.  Historically and 
theoretically, one of the primary roles of the judiciary has been to 
safeguard the rights of minority groups.  Such a responsibility necessitates 
a heightened level of review with respect to ideological exclusion—
regardless of whether national security is at stake. 
Too often, factions who oppose the expansion of constitutionally 
protected rights to non-citizens argue that the implementation of such 
measures will undermine the security concerns of the United States 
government.  They argue that the importance of security outweighs the 
importance of individual liberties.  Albeit difficult, it is imperative that 
Americans separate the emotional turmoil they felt following the terror 
attacks of September 11, 2001 from their perspective on the importance of 
individual liberties.  Even during the most turbulent periods of American 
history, the United States government and its people have an obligation to 
respect the basic and fundamental individual liberty of United States 
citizens to hear and debate the speech. 
 
                                                                                                                          
132 Ito, supra note 1. 
